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AUTOMOBILE LEASING AND THE VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY OF LESSORS 
Daniel J. Koevary∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2003, some of the largest automobile financing companies determined 
that they would no longer offer leasing in New York State.1  These 
companies ceased leasing because of a 1920s New York law that creates 
vicarious liability for car owners.2  The statute, New York Vehicle and 
Traffic Law section 388,3 has been interpreted to include long-term lessors 
as automobile owners4 because they hold title to the leased vehicles, even 
though the lessors do not possess the vehicles during the lease period.5
 
∗ J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A. Political Science, 
University of Rochester, 2001.  The author wishes to thank Professor Gail Hollister 
for her suggestions and assistance in writing this Comment and his brother, 
Jonathan Koevary, for his inspiration.  This Comment is dedicated to the author’s, 
Gail Koevary, who just wanted to lease a car. 
 
 1. Ed Garsten, Firms Halt N.Y. Vehicle Leases, DETROIT NEWS, July 6, 2003, at B 
(noting that the finance arms of General Motors, Ford, and Honda had stopped or planned to 
stop leasing in New York State in 2003). 
 2. Adam Rombel, Auto Dealers Adjust to Life With Lighter Leasing Load, CENT. N.Y. 
BUS. J., Dec. 19, 2003, at 3 (explaining that General Motors, Ford, and Honda “stopped 
leasing in New York because of mounting legal costs under the so-called ‘vicarious-
liability’ that allows accident victims to sue leasing companies for unlimited amounts”). 
 3. (McKinney 2004).  Section 388 states in pertinent part: 
1. Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and 
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from 
negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such 
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the 
permission, express or implied, of such owner . . . .  3. As used in this section, 
“owner” shall be as defined in section one hundred twenty-eight of this 
chapter and their liability under this section shall be joint and several. 
 4. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 128 (McKinney 2004) (defining a lessee possessing 
an automobile for more than thirty days as an owner).  This Comment does not address 
short-term leases—defined as leases that are for less than thirty days, for example, renting a 
car—and whether it is rational to hold car rental companies or other short-term lessors 
vicariously liable for their short-term lessees. 
 5. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Spandau, 186 A.D.2d 641, 642-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
(holding lessor company liable for lessee’s accident because lessor held title to the vehicle, 
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This Comment addresses whether holding such automobile lessors 
vicariously liable is justified.  Part I discusses the relevant background of 
the statute, case law interpreting the language of the statute, and the effect 
of the interpretation.  It also gives an overview of the different financing 
options available to automobile consumers and describes how New York 
auto purchases have been affected by section 388 in recent years.  Part II 
analyzes how vicarious liability is justified in general, focusing specifically 
on employer and employee relationships.  It further explores how vicarious 
liability can generally help to minimize the costs that a tortious actor can 
impose on society.  It concludes with an overview of the ways that 
insurance companies structure their product to operate efficiently.  Finally, 
Part III applies the justifications for vicarious liability in general to 
vicarious liability in automobile leasing specifically and addresses how 
vicarious liability forces lessors to perform the functions of insurers.  The 
Comment concludes that applying section 388 to lessors is bad policy for 
three reasons: first, because it holds lessors liable for the actions of a party 
whom they neither benefit from nor control; second, vicarious lessor 
liability does not appropriately apportion the cost of an accident to the 
party that caused the accident; and third, vicarious liability is inefficient in 
this context because it requires financing companies to assume the role of 
insurers.  Consequently, this Comment recommends that section 388 be 
amended to exclude lessors from vicarious liability. 
I. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 388 AND ITS MODERN IMPLICATIONS 
A.  The Statutes 
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388 was enacted in 1924 to 
“ensure access by injured persons to a ‘financially responsible insured 
person against whom to recover for injuries.”’6  The major policy goal of 
section 388 was to compensate automobile accident victims.7
Section 388 makes all owners of a vehicle jointly and severally liable for 
the negligence of any driver to whom an owner gives permission to drive 
the vehicle.
 
8
 
collected “rent” from the lessee, and did not offer lessee an option to purchase the vehicle at 
any point). 
  Section 388 refers to another section of the New York 
 6. See Morris v. Snappy Car Rental Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. 1994) (quoting 
Plath v. Justus, 268 N.E.2d 117, 119 (N.Y. 1971). 
 7. See John Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying Against Vicarious Liability Law, 
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 11, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying]. 
 8. See supra note 3. 
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Vehicle and Traffic Law, section 128, in its definition of “owner.”9  In 
section 128, an owner is defined as a person, other than a lien holder, who 
holds title to a vehicle.10  There can be multiple owners of a single car 
under this definition, including vehicle lessors.11  Even though lessors  that 
argue they should be considered lien holders, and thus excluded from the 
statutory definition of owner, New York courts have concluded that lessors 
are owners because they are titleholders.12
New York is one of fewer than a dozen states that hold an owner of a 
vehicle vicariously liable for a permissive user’s negligence.
 
13  Further, it 
has become the only state to impose unlimited liability for lessee 
negligence on lessors.14  The other two states which had unlimited lessor 
liability, Connecticut and Rhode Island, have passed statutes capping lessor 
liability within the last few years because vehicle financing companies 
threatened to stop leasing in those states unless their liability was removed 
or limited.15
B.  What is Leasing and Why is it Popular? 
 
Automobile leasing is a financing arrangement whereby a lessee, in 
exchange for monthly payments, obtains possession of an automobile for 
an agreed term.16  When a lease commences, a financing company17
 
 9. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW  § 388(3) (McKinney 2004). 
 (or 
 10. § 128; see also Harry Steinberg, Vicarious Liability of Motor Vehicle Owners Under 
V&TL § 388 is Extensively Litigated, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 37 (1998). 
 11. E.g., Sullivan v. Spandau, 186 A.D.2d. 641, 642-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
 12. E.g., id. 
 13. Steinberg, supra note 10, at 36. 
 14. Rombel, supra note 2. 
 15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-154a (2005) (amended by 2003 Conn. Legis. Serv. 250 
(West)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4 (2005) (amended by 2003 R.I. Pub. Laws 117 § 2); 
Diane Levick, Leasing Firms May Get Incentive, HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2003, at E2 
(stating that Connecticut reversed its vicarious liability law); Kathleen Yanity, Lease 
Decrease—Incentive, Liability, Drive Down Popularity, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 22, 2003, at 
G1 (stating that Rhode Island reversed its vicarious liability law).  Lessor liability has been 
capped for death or injury at $100,000 for one person and $300,000 for multiple persons in 
Connecticut.  Levick, supra.  Rhode Island’s new statute has the same terms.  Yanity, supra.  
As a result of placing a cap on lessor liability, the financing companies that threatened to 
leave the Connecticut and Rhode Island market decided to continue leasing in both states.  
Liz Moyer, JPM Unit to Resume Auto Leasing in R.I., AM. BANKER, July 9, 2003, at 2; 
Yanity, supra. 
 16. Ralph J. Rohner, Leasing Consumer Goods: The Spotlight Shifts to the Uniform 
Consumer Leases Act, 35 CONN. L. REV. 647, 651 (2003).  A “lease” is defined in the 
U.C.C. as “the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration.”  
U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(p) (2004). 
 17. Most lessors are financing companies whose traditional businesses consist of 
financing auto purchases between consumers and auto dealers.  See Stuart M. Litwin, The 
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“lessor”) purchases a vehicle from a dealer and then the financing company 
leases the vehicle to the consumer (or “lessee”).18  The lessor retains the 
vehicle’s title and resells the vehicle at the end of the lease term when the 
vehicle is returned.  Vehicles depreciate in value over time and, although 
there will probably be a significant residual value—the value of the vehicle 
after the lease ends—by the end of the lease term, most vehicles are worth 
far less than when they were new.19  To recoup this value, the lessor will 
set the lease price by determining how much the car will depreciate over 
the course of the lease term.20  As the titleholder, the lessor can treat the 
leased cars as depreciable assets and take tax deductions for the 
depreciation.21
Consumers like leasing because less money is required upfront and 
monthly payments are lower in a lease than for the purchase of a vehicle on 
credit.
 
22  Lease payments cover the value of the car over a set period of 
time, after which possession of the car reverts to the lessor, while a 
consumer under a credit purchase eventually has unencumbered ownership 
of the car.23  Thus, monthly payments on the lease will be based on the 
lower total cost of owning the vehicle for the lease term instead of on the 
total purchase price of the vehicle.24  Lower monthly payments give 
consumers a chance to drive a vehicle that they might find too expensive if 
they were purchasing the car on credit25 and are also advantageous to 
businesses that would prefer to rent.26
A key difference between loans and credit purchases under New York 
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388
 
27
 
Future of Auto Lease Securitization, 797 PRAC. L. INST. 581, 586 (1999). 
 is that under a lease, but not under a 
 18. Id. at 587-88.  In a typical vehicle lease, the original lessor is a car dealer who 
assigns the lease to a financing company.  Rohner, supra note 16, at 652 n.21. 
 19. See Litwin, supra note 17, at 588-89; Rohner, supra note 16, at 650 n.11. 
 20. Rohner, supra note 18, at 650 n.11. 
 21. Telephone Interview with Charles Territo, Spokesperson, Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers (May 13, 2004). 
 22. Rohner, supra note 16, at 650. 
 23. Id. at 650 n.11. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Id.  One article cited a consumer who wanted to lease a Chevrolet Cavalier because 
she was “short on cash but long on desire.”  Marc Santora, Carmakers Limit New York 
Leases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004, at A1. 
 26. Telephone Interview with Charles Territo, supra note 21.  The total cost of leasing 
may be more expensive than purchasing a vehicle on credit because, even though the 
monthly payments are lower, at the end of the term, a lessee does not possess an asset 
whereas in a credit purchase the owner does.  Even if individual consumers are cognizant of 
this fact, some may prefer to have lower monthly payments throughout the term, instead of 
higher payments and an asset.  See supra note 26 and accompnaying text. 
 27. (McKinney 2004). 
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credit purchase, the financing company, not the lessee, has title to the 
vehicle.28  In a sale, the consumer is the titleholder and the lender’s rights 
and liabilities are limited to that of a creditor.29
Leasing has become a very popular form of auto ownership in New 
York, particularly in the New York City Metropolitan Area.
  Section 388 holds lessors 
liable, but not lenders, because lessors are title-holders. 
30  Consumers 
benefit because the lower payments allow them to drive new cars every two 
to four years if they desire.31
C.  Recent Impact of Section 388 
  Having the option to lease or to purchase also 
gives consumers more flexibility in deciding how they want to own an 
automobile. 
The mounting costs associated with section 388 are attributable to rising 
amounts in jury awards and to, what seems to some, outrageous 
determinations of lessor liability.32  Lessors claim that vicarious liability 
under section 388 has cost them over $1 billion since 1997 in New York,33 
and that between August 2001 to August 2002 there were over 215 
vicarious liability suits against them, seeking a total of $1.6 billion.34
Last year, the finance arms of General Motors, Ford, and Honda stopped 
leasing in New York because of the increasing costs associated with 
liability under section 388.
  Even 
if the lessors were to prevail in many of these suits, litigation costs would 
still be substantial. 
35  These lenders account for seventy-five 
percent of car leases in New York.36
 
 28. Rohner, supra note 16, at 651. 
  Chase Manhattan Automotive 
 29. Id. at 650–51. 
 30. See Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 7.  In 2002, roughly one 
quarter of all vehicles acquired in New York were obtained through leases.  Id.  In a study 
conducted by J. D. Power and Associates, national leasing was found to account for 14.7% 
of all new vehicle sales in June 2003, whereas in the New York City Metropolitan Area they 
accounted for 31.4% of sales.  Garsten, supra note 1. 
 31. See Rohner, supra note 16, at 650. 
 32. Cf. Rombel, supra note 2.  An oft-cited case for critics of lessor vicarious liability 
laws is a Rhode Island case, Oliveira v. Lombardi.  794 A.2d 453 (R.I. 2002) (holding a 
lessor vicariously liable for its lessee’s negligence).  There, the jury returned a verdict 
against the lessor, Chase Manhattan Automotive Finance Corp., of approximately $19 
million.  Oliveira v. Lombardi, R.I. Ref. No. 401968WL, 2002 WL 32058080 (R.I. Super. 
Aug. 7, 2002).  The parties later settled for an undisclosed amount.  Id.  As noted, Rhode 
Island has since capped lessor vicarious liability.  See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 33. Andrea Baker, Lenders On Law: Release Us, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2003, at C25. 
 34. Alan M. Christenfeld & Shepard W. Melzer, Secured Transactions: Contrasting 
Liability of Owners and Lessors for Aircraft and Autos, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 4, 2003, at 5. 
 35. Garsten, supra note 1; Rombel, supra note 2.  
 36. Rombel, supra note 2. 
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Financing Corp., the auto leasing arm of J.P. Morgan Chase and Co., and 
several smaller lenders have also discontinued offering leases in New 
York.37  Some of the companies that continue to lease cars have altered 
their lease terms by raising their fees several hundred dollars to account for 
their liability under section 388.38  Some that stopped leasing altogether 
began offering balloon payment options instead.39
Balloon payment options are similar to leases in that a consumer takes 
possession of a vehicle for a set term while making monthly payments.  
Under this approach, however, at the end of the term the consumer has the 
option of either making a “balloon” payment and obtaining unencumbered 
ownership of the vehicle, or returning the vehicle (and title).
 
40  The key 
difference is that during the term of the agreement, the consumer, not the 
finance company, is the titleholder, and thus the finance companies are not 
vicariously liable under section 388.41  The consumer makes payments as 
though he were owning the vehicle only for a set term and then, in 
consideration for not having to pay the cost of buying the car outright, 
returns it to the dealer.42
Balloon payment plans, however, are more expensive than leases for two 
reasons.  First, the monthly balloon payments are higher because 
consumers pay interest as though they had purchased the vehicle on 
credit.
 
43  In a lease, the consumer only pays interest based on the total cost 
of the lease, not the entire purchase price of the car.  Second, the consumer 
must pay sales tax as though he were purchasing the car in its entirety 
rather than for a set lease term.44
 
 37. Id. 
  This is because the sales tax will be based 
 38. See, e.g., Bill Platt, Leasing a Chrysler or Mercedes Will Cost More in Four States, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at D7 (noting that Chrysler and Mercedes planned to add a 
$1000 fee to all new leased vehicles in Connecticut, Kentucky, New York, and Rhode 
Island). 
 39. Rombel, supra note 2. 
 40. See generally, Jeremy Boyer, Dealers Steer Way Past Loss of Leasing, TIMES 
UNION, July 3, 2003, at E1. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Cf. id. 
 43. It is unclear why the interest rates for a balloon payment are based on the price of 
the car if it were purchased.  It is possible that the finance companies base these rates on the 
total sale price because they want to ensure that a court sees substantive differences in a 
balloon payment and lease.  If a court were to find them too similar, they may consider it a 
lease, in which case the financing company would remain liable under section 388.  But the 
finance companies may be doing this without justification and could reduce it to the levels 
of a lease.  Regardless of whether the finance companies could lower their rates, they have 
not.  In the end, it hurts consumers because they are still paying more than they would have 
under a balloon payment than a lease.  Cf. id. 
 44. Boyer, supra note 40. 
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on the entire retail cost of the car for a balloon payment,45 whereas for a 
lease, sales tax is only based on the total cost of the lease.46  Because of 
these increased costs, financing companies do not consider balloon 
payments to be competitively priced and they claim that they will not use 
balloon payments for much longer because consumers will choose to buy 
on credit instead.47
D.  Current Legislation and Lobbyists For and Against Section 388 
 
Several trade organizations have spoken out against section 388,48 
including, not surprisingly, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, the 
National Vehicle Leasing Association, and the New York State Automobile 
Dealers Association.49  The New York State Bar Association has also 
criticized section 388.50  These critics allege that vicarious liability under 
section 388 is unfair because it holds them liable for the acts of people over 
whom they have no control.51
 
 45. See id.  The title holder of a vehicle is responsible for paying sales tax.  Tom 
Incantalupo, Interest Grows in the Long Loan, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2003, at C7. 
  Opponents further claim that section 388 
limits consumer choices, hurts auto sales, and is not needed to help injured 
 46. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1111(i) (McKinney 2004); Maria T. Jones, et al., 2000-2001 
Survey of New York Law: State and Local Taxation, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 656; see 
Boyer, supra note 40.  In a lease, the lessor purchases the car from the dealer and is thus 
liable for sales tax based on the entire purchase price of the car.  See supra note 45 and 
accompnaying text.  It is possible, but not necessarily true, that the lessor will pass some of 
this cost on to the consumer.  In a balloon payment, the consumer purchases the car from the 
dealer, albeit for a limited term set by the consumer’s agreement with the financing 
company, and is responsible for sales tax based on the entire purchase price of the car.  See 
supra note 45 and accompanying text.  Thus, in a lease, the consumer must pay sales tax 
based on the lease price and the financing company may pass some of the costs of the sales 
tax it paid on to the consumer.  But in a balloon payment, the consumer will definitely pay 
sales tax based on the cost of purchasing the entire car.  This makes it possible that under a 
lease the lessee will pay more in sales taxes than what he pays in taxes for the lease itself 
because he may have the additional cost of reimbursing the lessor.  But under a balloon 
payment, the consumer is guaranteed to pay the full sales tax.  Furthermore, if the consumer 
does not make the balloon payment at the end of the term, he will transfer title to the 
financing company, and they will pay a sales tax—based on the balloon payment—because 
title is being transferred.  The financing company could also pass along some of its costs to 
the consumer here, but will not necessarily do so.  
 47. See Boyer, supra note 40.  
 48. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004). 
 49. See Baker, supra note 33; John Caher, Lobbyists Push for Last-Minute Tort Reform 
in State Legislature, N.Y. L.J. , June 18, 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Caher, Lobbyists Push For 
Last-Minute Tort Reform]. 
 50. See Barbara Woller, State Bar Backs Lease Law Changes, J. NEWS, Apr. 12, 2003, at 
D. 
 51. Caher, Lobbyists Push for Last-Minute Tort Reform, supra note 59; Woller, supra 
note 50. 
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parties.52  They assert that the legislature’s fondness for section 388 arises 
from the fact that the law discourages leases, thereby increasing car sales 
and sales tax revenues, and increases tax revenues because unless the 
financing companies lease cars, they cannot take depreciation deductions 
on them.53
Proponents of section 388 include the New York Public Interest 
Research Group, a consumer interest group,
 
54 and the New York State Trial 
Lawyers Association.55  These groups contend that the law should remain 
intact because it compensates tort victims who would otherwise be 
inadequately compensated by financially irresponsible drivers.  Although 
these proponents of the statute imply that such compensation in itself 
justifies section 388, they also assert that section 388 does not substantially 
hurt automobile sales.56  They contend that the auto industry wants the 
statute repealed only so financing companies can continue to claim tax 
deductions for depreciation on the leased vehicles.57
A bill that would amend the law by excluding lessors from liability 
under section 388 passed in the New York State Senate, but has been 
frozen in committee in the State Assembly.
 
58  State Assembly speaker 
Sheldon Silver opposes any changes to the law, citing his concern for 
accident victims and his belief that the law does not cause the automobile 
industry undue harm.59
II.  THEORIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 
 
A.  Vicarious Liability 
This section discusses whether, under a tort law regime that is 
 
 52. Caher, Lobbyists Push For Last-Minute Tort Reform, supra note 49. 
 53. The total amount of taxes the state collects are more for balloon payments and sales 
than they are for consumer leases because consumers, unlike lessors, cannot deduct 
depreciation expenses on their tax returns because only businesses can deduct for 
depreciable assets.  N.Y. State Trial Lawyer’s Ass’n, Two Faces: The Auto Leasing 
Industry’s $1.1 Billion Tax Deduction for Cars It Says It Doesn’t Really Own, June 2003, 
available at http://www.nystla.org/nicecontent/documents/Vicarious%20Report.PDF.  
Lessors, who are liable for the sales tax in a lease are able to deduct for depreciation, so 
even though the sales tax will be technically the same for a lease, balloon payment, or sale, 
leases result in lower taxes after deductions.  Id. 
 54. Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8. 
 55. Baker, supa note 33; Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8. 
 56. See Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8. 
 57. See Baker, supra note 33; N.Y. State Trial Lawyer’s Ass’n, supra note 55. 
 58. See N.Y. A.B. 7453 (2005); Caher, Car Makers Step Up Lobbying, supra note 8.  
 59. Santora, supra note 25. 
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predominately negligence based, holding a party vicariously liable is 
justified.  Vicarious liability, unlike negligence, may hold a party liable 
when it is not at fault.60  In general, liability under tort law in the United 
States is based on finding fault.61
Vicarious liability provides an exception to this general rule in that it 
imposes liability upon one party for a wrong committed by another.
 
62  It is 
most commonly associated with employer-employee relationships.63  
Because vicarious liability imposes liability on a party who is not at fault, it 
must be justified by reasons distinct from those supporting negligence 
liability.64
The discussion below describes the rationale supporting vicarious 
liability.
 
65
One of the benefits of vicarious liability is that it may increase the 
chances that a plaintiff can recover for his loss because he can sue more—
and wealthier—defendants.
  There are several theories justifying vicarious liability, but the 
predominate theory, enterprise liability, holds that an enterprise should be 
liable for the costs associated with its business.  Of lesser importance, but 
related to the justification by enterprise liability, is when the party being 
held vicariously liable has the ability to control the negligent party.  
Vicarious liability may also be justified when it forces the defendant to 
internalize costs it would otherwise impose on society. 
66  This alone, however, is not sufficient 
justification for the doctrine.67
 
 60. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 481 (5th ed. 1999). 
  If it were, vicarious liability would 
 61. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 (Ct. App. 1971) (refusing to 
hold drivers strictly liable for their actions).  Justice McKenna wrote “the very foundation of 
right—of the essence of liberty as it is of morals—[is] to be free from liability if one is free 
from fault.”  Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 436 (1919) (McKenna, J., 
dissenting); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94-95 (1881). 
 62. Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the 
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 
(1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Paula J. Dalley, All in a Days Work: Employers’ Vicarious Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 517, 527-28 (2002) (“Vicarious liability . . . is based in the 
agency relationship itself and is not dependant on tort principles such as fault or on tort 
policies such as accident prevention.”). 
 65. At least one scholar does not think vicarious liability has ever been fully justified, 
arguing that it has become so embedded in our legal system that it is accepted without 
justification.  See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739 (1996) (arguing that the 
overwhelming consensus favoring vicarious liability in the United States obviates 
persuasive justification for the doctrine). 
 66. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 64, at 584. 
 67. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 
1968) (citations omitted). 
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dominate the tort system instead of being the bounded anomaly that it is. 
1. Enterprise Liability 
An employer is justifiably held vicariously liable if an employee, while 
acting for the employer’s benefit, negligently causes harm.68  This is 
because the employer’s enterprise should bear the costs associated with 
running its business.69  These costs include social harms that the enterprise 
causes, including the costs of an employee’s negligence.70  Thus, if an 
employee acts negligently in performing activities for the benefit of the 
enterprise, both the employee and the enterprise should be held jointly and 
severally liable for the tort: the employee because he caused harm by acting 
negligently and the enterprise because it benefits from the employee’s 
actions.71
Without vicarious liability, victims of insolvent employees would be 
unable to recover, thus allowing the enterprise to impose large costs on 
society through the actions of their employees.
 
72
 
 68. See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise 
Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997).  The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 
219(1) states that with regard to agency law, vicarious liability is only used when a principal 
and agent are in a master-servant relationship, also known as an employer-employee 
relationship.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to 
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their 
employment.”).  If the agent is an independent contractor then, barring the doctrine of 
negligent entrustment, the principal is not held vicariously liable.  Id. § 2 (distinguishing 
masters, servants, and independent contractors); id. § 220 (defining servant).  Although the 
principal still benefits from the agent’s activities, whether an agent is a servant or 
independent contractor, the benefits are distinguishable.  One scholar distinguished them, 
writing that “the servant is ‘an integral part of his master’s establishment,’ whereas the non-
servant ‘aids in the business enterprise but is not a part of it.’”  Dalley, supra note 64, at 541 
(citation omitted).  Thus, a principal should be liable for a servant’s negligence because the 
servant is part of the business, but a principal should not be liable for the torts of an 
independent contractor, even though the independent contractor confers a benefit on the 
principal, because the independent contractor is not a part of the business.  This distinction 
is one of several between servants and independent contractors in the Restatement (Second) 
of Agency.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220.  Other distinctions are discussed 
infra Part II.A.2. 
  With vicarious liability, 
 69. Keating, supra note 68, at 1269. 
 70. See id. at 1293. 
 71. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 564-66.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2) imposes vicarious liability on employers only for 
employee torts committed in the “scope of employment.”  When an employee acts outside 
the scope of business, he is not acting in the interest of advancing the enterprise and so it 
would be unfair to impose damages on the employer.  See id. § 219 cmt. e; Sykes, 
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 583-85. 
 72. Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1244 
(1984) [hereinafter Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability].  Professor Sykes hypothesizes 
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however, assuming the employer is solvent, tort victims can be fully 
compensated by the entity that benefits from the accident-causing 
conduct.73  If employers did not pay these costs, tort victims who could not 
fully recover from a negligent employee would unjustly incur the costs of 
the employer’s business.74
2. Control Test 
 
Another justification for vicarious liability, though not as strong, is 
holding a party vicariously liable because he is able to control the negligent 
party.75  For this reason, the Restatement (Second) Agency distinguishes 
between master-servant relationships in which there is vicarious liability 
because of a particular control element and independent contractor 
relationships where no such liability exists because the same type of control 
is not present.76  Under the Restatement, a finding of vicarious liability 
depends on the extent to which the principal controls the agent’s work.77  
For these purposes, control is not determined by an employer’s actual 
intervention into an employee’s act, but instead by the employer’s right to 
intervene as to the manner in which the employee’s actions for the 
employer are performed.78
 
that if employers were not vicariously liable, they would be able to unjustly impose some of 
the costs of their business on society in the numerous cases where the employee cannot fully 
compensate the victim.  If employees were not vicariously liable, they might avoid hiring 
solvent employees because a solvent employee with bargaining power is more likely to 
require his employer to indemnify him for his negligence.  So, employers may decide to hire 
only insolvent employees so the enterprise can avoid some of the costs of its activities.  See 
Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 569. 
  If one party holds enough control over the 
other, the relationship will be considered master-servant (or employer-
employee) and the employer-principal may be held vicariously liable for 
the employee-agent’s negligence in the course of employment.  If, on the 
other hand, a party cannot control the other’s work, the negligent party will 
be considered an independent contractor and usually the hiring party will 
 73. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 569. 
 74. See id. 
 75. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 122 (3d ed. 2001). 
 76. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, supra note 62, at 582. 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220. 
 78. Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1261-71.  Control is 
viewed by some commentators as mostly illusory.  See Dalley, supra note 64, at 536.  To 
the extent control can be found, the employer may be held directly liable for the employee’s 
negligence without vicarious liability.  Id.  Thus, they argue, vicarious liability must be 
justified on another basis.  Id.  These arguments hold some weight, however, and, as stated, 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency and case law have used the right to control as a test in 
determining whether to hold a party vicariously liable.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY §§ 219-20  (1958). 
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not be held vicariously liable.79
Although an employer’s ability to control his employees is limited—for 
example automobile accidents may occur as the result of simple 
carelessness that the employer may be unable to prevent—the right to 
control is still important to vicarious liability.
 
80  An employee act under the 
direction of his employer, and, although he may have some discretion in 
how he performs his work, he must ultimately perform his job in a manner 
that is acceptable to his employer.81  The employer, however, has no right 
to tell an independent contractor how to perform his job, even though the 
independent contractor is acting for the benefit of the principal. 82  Thus, it 
seems inequitable to hold the employer liable for injuries caused by the 
independent contractor over whom the employer has no control.83
The right to control the tortfeasor is essential if vicarious liability is to be 
imposed on an employer because without that right, an employer has no 
ability to demand that their employees take precautions against 
negligence.
 
84
 
 79. See GREGORY, supra note 77, at 1358 n.214. 
  If an employer does not properly exercise this control, it is 
 80. See generally Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1268-71.  
As one court stated, “It is not the actual interference or exercise of the control by the 
employer, but the existence of the right or authority to interfere or control, which renders 
one a servant rather than an independent contractor.”  E.g., Wallis v. Sec. of Kan. Dep’t of 
Human Res., 689 P.2d 787, 792 (Kan. 1984).  In a later case, the same court elaborated 
further: 
An independent contractor is defined as one who, in exercising an independent 
employment, contracts to do certain work according to his own methods, without 
being subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results or product of 
his own work.  The primary test used by the courts in determining whether the 
employer-employee relationship exists is whether the employer has the right of 
control and supervision over the work of the alleged employee, and the right to 
direct the manner in which the work is to be performed, as well as the result which 
is to be accomplished.  It is not the actual interference or exercise of control by the 
employer, but the existence of the right or authority to interfere or control, which 
renders one a servant rather than an independent contractor. 
Bishop ex rel. Mitzner v. State, 891 P.2d 435, 437 (Kan. 1995) (citation omitted).   
 81. Wallis, 689 P.2d at 792.  “The primary test used by courts in determining whether 
the employer-employee relationship exists is whether the employer has . . . the right to direct 
the manner in which the work is to be performed, as well as the result which is to be 
accomplished.”  Id. 
 82. See GREGORY, supra note 75, at 114. 
 83. See id. 
 84. An employer may be able to demand that an independent contractor take safety 
precautions.  But since independent contractors, unlike employees, often run their own 
businesses as separate entities from their employers, they are probably in a better position 
than employers to decide what precautions to take.  Furthermore, they are more likely to 
take necessary precautions because their businesses will be more likely than an employee to 
pay the full costs of damages.  Cf. supra note 80 (describing the role of the independent 
contractor). 
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reasonable that he should be held liable for the employee’s negligence 
because the employer has failed to take necessary precautions.85
3. Externalities 
 
Economists’ concept of externalities provides another justification for 
imposing vicarious liability on employers.  An externality arises when a 
party receives a benefit without fully paying for it.86  For example, a 
polluting factory that produces widgets benefits from the sale of the 
widgets.  If the residents of a town near the factory are damaged by the 
pollution, but the factory is not required to pay the residents for the 
pollution damage, the factory has created an externality equal to the 
pollution damage.  Economists believe it is efficient, and thus beneficial, to 
require entities such as this factory to internalize such externalities by 
requiring them to pay for these injuries instead of imposing these costs on 
society.87  In the polluting factory example, this could be accomplished if 
nuisance law either granted an injunction against the factory or required the 
factory to pay damages to the town residents.88
If employers were not liable for injuries caused by their employees’ torts 
committed within the scope of their employment, an externality would be 
created whenever the employee could not fully pay for the damages.  In 
such cases, the employer would be receiving the benefits of the employee’s 
work, but imposing part of the costs of the work on the public—the 
uncompensated injuries caused by the employee’s tort.  When this occurs, 
the enterprise unfairly profits because it is imposing some of its costs on 
the victim.
 
89
On the other hand, if the employer is held vicariously liable for the 
employee’s negligence, then the employer will be forced to internalize the 
 
 
 85. Theoretically, if the employer demands that his employee take reasonable 
precautions and the employee complies, the employee that caused an accident will not be 
held negligent because he will not have violated the standard of care.  If the employee is not 
negligent, then the employer cannot be held vicariously liable.  See Father Belle Cmty. Ctr. 
v. N.Y. Div. of Hum. Rts. ex rel. King, 221 A.D.2d 44, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Both 
State and Federal cases require, as a predicate for imposing liability, that there be some 
basis for imputing the employee’s conduct to the employer; neither imposes liability on the 
employer based solely on the employment relationship.”) (citations omitted). 
 86. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 44 (4th ed. 2004). 
 87. See id. at 45. 
 88. See id. at 310.   
 89. See id. at 44-45.  When an externality is created, economists believe that the 
externality generator’s production is inflated.  See id. at 45.  This is so because the 
externality generator will produce more output than would be profitable if he were paying 
for all the costs associated with production himself.  See id.  If the producer internalized his 
costs, he would either have to decrease production or receive less profit. 
KOEVARYCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:03 PM 
114 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
costs that his business imposes on society.  By internalizing these costs, the 
enterprise’s profits will rightly reflect the enterprise’s total cost of 
production, avoiding inefficiently inflating production at the expense of 
society.90
B.  Insurer’s Ability to Assess an Insured’s Propensity for Risk 
 
The availability of insurance is important in tort law and relevant to 
vicarious liability.91
Insurance functions by pooling together large numbers of insureds based 
on the risk exposures of the insured.
  This section discusses some common insurance 
concepts while Part III addresses how insurance applies to vicarious 
liability. 
92  Insurers rely on the fact that if they 
pool large numbers together, a certain percentage of those insured will have 
claims while the others will not.93
Insurance is more efficient when the insurer is able to segregate its 
customers into narrow risk pools related to their propensity for risk.
  Of course, all the insureds pay in 
premiums, so the insurer collects premiums from all its insured and pays 
only a few. 
94
One problem that arises when insurers are not able to segregate 
customers into risk pools is called “adverse selection.”
  To 
effectively assess risk, insurers must research their customers carefully so 
that the customers are assessed the correct premiums and deductibles for 
their insurance policies.  The higher the risk exposure for any given 
insured, the higher his premium should be because there is a greater chance 
that a loss will occur or that loss will be larger.  Because the insurer 
charges insureds in the same pool the same rates, the pools must be narrow 
to correctly charge customers. 
95  Adverse selection 
arises when high-risk insureds enter a low-risk pool.96
 
 90. See Sykes, Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 72, at 1251.  When an 
enterprise does not fully internalize its production costs, it does not account for those costs 
when calculating how much it should produce.  Thus, the enterprise could produce more 
than is efficient because it imposes some of its production costs on society. 
  Statistically, these 
 91. See generally David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without 
Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 857 (2001) (discussing the 
“symbiotic relationship of torts and insurance”). 
 92. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1540 (1987). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“It is crucial to the insurance enterprise to segregate uncorrelated risks, as much 
as possible, into separate, narrowly-defined risk pools . . . .”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 1540-41 (explaining that the presence of high-risk persons in a risk pool 
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high-risk individuals will be paid more than their low-risk counterparts, but 
will only pay low-risk premiums.  If adverse selection is prevalent, 
premiums charged to all members of the pool will rise to reflect the 
additional risk.97  As a result, low-risk insureds will either drop out of the 
pool because the costs of obtaining insurance are too high, or they will 
remain in the pool, paying high premiums that would not be required but 
for the presence of the high-risk individuals.98
Insurers use a variety of methods to narrowly define their risk pools.  For 
example, insurers can charge different rates for different classes of drivers 
so that those with a statistically higher risk of accidents are placed in a pool 
that is charged higher premiums.  Insurers can also assess risk by 
inspecting safety measures and charging higher rates to those who have 
more risk.  Additionally, they can base their rates on the value of whatever 
is being insured.  By distinguishing between different risks, insurers can 
operate most efficiently and provide coverage at a fair price to a broad 
range of people.
 
99
III. SECTION 388 SHOULD BE REPEALED  
 
The remaining portion of this Comment discusses how the principles 
discussed in Part II should be applied to determine whether imposing 
vicarious liability on automobile lessors is desirable.  It concludes that it is 
not desirable and recommends amending section 388 of the New York 
Vehicle and Traffic Law100
Section 388 has hurt consumers in New York.
 to exclude vehicle lessors from vicarious 
liability. 
101  Some lessors that still 
offer leases in New York charge more for auto leases than in other states 
because of the need to pay for losses imposed under section 388.102  
Because of the higher rates, consumers’ choices of how to finance vehicle 
purchases are limited and some consumers are deterred from obtaining new 
vehicles as often as they would if leasing were still offered by all financing 
companies.103
 
increases the range of risk, causing persons with a low risk level to pay disproportionately 
high rates). 
  An alternative to leasing, balloon payments, also harms 
 97. See id. at 1541. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 1545 (listing driver age, property value, and the existence or absence of 
smoke alarms as some of the factors considered in determining risk pools). 
 100. (McKinney 2004). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39. 
 102. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 103. See supra Part I.C and text accompanying note 52. 
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potential lessees because they pay higher monthly payments on vehicle 
purchases than they do under a traditional lease.104  Furthermore, because 
financing companies think balloon payments are too high in price to 
compete with credit sales, they have threatened to discontinue balloon 
payments plans from New York.105
Section 388 also presumably has negative collateral effects on both the 
environment and public safety.  By raising the price of leased cars, section 
388 deters some consumers from acquiring new cars as often as they would 
if traditional leasing were an option.  Technological advances making 
newer cars cleaner for the environment and safer for drivers and passengers 
are thus available to fewer people.
  Thus whatever relief this option 
offered to consumers by giving them an option similar to a lease may soon 
disappear. 
106  Furthermore, regardless of 
technological advances, newer cars run more efficiently than older ones 
because all of their parts are newer and in good working order.107
It is clear that section 388 has harmed both finance companies and 
consumers.  Thus it should only remain law if there is sufficient 
justification for the imposition of vicarious liability.
  Barriers 
to leasing like section 388 thus have a negative effect on both the 
environment and public safety. 
108
A.  Why Justifications for Vicarious Liability in General Do Not 
Justify Vicarious Lessor Liability 
  Whether this 
justification exists is discussed below. 
Vicarious liability is only imposed in one kind of auto sale arrangement 
 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47. 
 105. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 and 103 (explaining that section 388 
limits consumer choices for financing, and as a result consumers obtain new cars less 
frequently than if leasing were still an option). 
 107. For example, as engine parts in a car wear down, the engine becomes less efficient 
and uses more gasoline and oil per mile. 
 108. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  Before discussing the merits of New 
York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388, it should be noted that proponents of the statute 
often argue that the statute should apply to automobile lessors because leasing permits 
lessors to claim depreciation on leased vehicles for tax purposes and that by imposing 
liability, section 388 deprives lessors of this improper tax avoidance.  (McKinney 2004).  
This, however, is irrelevant in considering whether section 388 is good public policy.  If 
lessors are improperly avoiding tax liability by claiming depreciation on their leased 
vehicles, they are doing so because the tax law allows for it.  If it is bad policy, the tax law 
should be changed.  Therefore, tax avoidance by lessors is an insufficient justification for  
imposing vicarious liability under section 388. 
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in New York: leasing.109  There is no reason offered as to why liability on 
financing companies is proper in that situation but not others.  Regardless 
of whether a vehicle is purchased in cash, financed over time, paid for by 
balloon payments, or funded through a traditional lease, all of the parties 
are in substantially similar positions.  The dealer is selling a car, the bank is 
making a loan, the driver possesses and uses the vehicle, and, if there is an 
accident, the victim is injured.  Regardless of the type of transaction, the 
bank and dealer have deep pockets that would benefit the injured plaintiff if 
the driver is insolvent.  But, only under a lease does a plaintiff have access 
to these deep pockets.110  As discussed above, vicarious liability is justified 
in employment relationships. The same reasoning, however, is inapplicable 
to a leasing situation, leaving no justification for why vicarious liability 
should be applied to lessors.111
Vicarious liability in employment relationships is justified in part 
because the loss occurs in the course of the employer’s business.
  
112  An 
enterprise should be held liable for the costs directly associated with its 
business.113  Losses arising from the negligence of a lessee, however, are 
not directly associated with a financing company’s business.114
Similarly, lessors have no power to control the conduct of their lessees, 
so vicarious liability cannot be justified on those grounds.
  A finance 
company’s business purpose is to make a profit by leasing cars.  It does not 
profit from the lessee’s use of the car.  Indeed, the less the lessee uses the 
car, the higher the value of the car returned to the lessor, and the greater the 
lessor’s profit.  Thus, the leasing situation differs from an employer-
employee situation in a way that goes to the heart of the reason for 
imposing vicarious liability.  Because financing companies do not directly 
benefit from lessees’ use of the car, they should not be held liable for their 
lessee’s negligence. 
115  Control, an 
important factor for imposing vicarious liability in the employment 
context,116
 
 109. See supra Part I.A. 
 does not exist in the lease situation.  There is generally no 
 110. See supra Part I.A. 
 111. See supra Part II.A. 
 112. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 113. See supra Part II.A.1 
 114. This is demonstrated by two examples.  In the first scenario, A leases a vehicle to X 
and X subsequently injures P while driving to the post office.  In the second, A hires X to 
drive A’s truck.  While driving the truck to deliver goods for A, X injures P.  A directly 
benefits from X’s driving in the second example, but not the first. 
 115. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 116. See supra Part II.A.2 
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vicarious liability in an independent contractor relationship,117 even though 
the independent contractor is performing a service for the employer.118  
The lessor is even more removed from the lessee than is the employer from 
the independent contractor.  Thus, the two lynchpins often used to justify 
vicarious liability for employers—injury in the course of the employer’s 
business119 and control by the employer120
Furthermore, financing companies do not pose an externality problem.  
Unlike an enterprise that benefits from an activity that causes social 
costs,
—do not exist in leasing. 
121 a financing company neither causes accidents nor benefits from 
them.  As stated, the accidents caused by lessee negligence are not directly 
related to a lessor’s business.  Since the financing company does not 
generate an externality to internalize, section 388122
Lessors do not profit from lessee actions, nor do they have a right to 
control them.  Further, forcing them to pay for harm caused by lessees does 
not internalize the cost.  None of the reasons for imposing vicarious 
liability on employers applies to leasing.
 merely transfers the 
lessee’s liability to his lessor.  A negligent lessee imposes an externality on 
his victim: in gaining a benefit through driving, the lessee causes harm to 
the victim.  When the lessee does not compensate the victim, he creates an 
externality.  But, lessor vicarious liability does not internalize this 
externality, it merely ensures that the cost will be imposed on someone 
other than the victim.  The only way the cost could be internalized would 
be if the lessee himself paid for the injury.  Shifting the loss to another 
party does not internalize the cost. 
123  Section 388 holds automobile 
lessors liable for a third-person’s fault, even though the rationale 
supporting similar vicarious liability rules does not apply.  Thus, the only 
justification for section 388 is compensating victims.  This, however, is 
insufficient to hold lessors’ liable.124
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
  Making a person pay for another’s 
injury simply because he can afford to do so violates basic notions of 
fairness and cannot be used as sole justification for tort law. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 82. 
 119. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 120. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 121. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 122. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004). 
 123. See supra Part II.A (outlining the justifications for vicarious liability). 
 124. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Why Finance Companies Acting as Insurers is Inefficient and 
Expensive 
Section 388 forces financing companies to act as insurers, but using 
section 388 to compensate tort victims is inefficient from an insurance 
perspective for several reasons.  First, liability insurance companies are in a 
better position to assess risk than financing companies: assessing such risks 
is insurance companies’ specialty, while financing companies are in the 
business of financing automobile purchases.  It is inefficient for the law to 
force financing companies to hire insurance experts and thus raise 
financing costs.  Insurers should handle the insuring business, and financers 
should handle the financing business. 
Second, insurance policies are more flexible than leases and can respond 
when additional information, such as a poor driving record, becomes 
known.  An insurer can and will raise a lessee’s premium and per incident 
deduction in response to poor driving.  Car leases, however, do not allow 
rate changes based on a lessee’s risk history.  Although it is theoretically 
possible to structure a lease so that the lease payments will vary depending 
on the lessee’s driving record, such a structure would involve tremendous 
transaction costs.  For example, this type of structure would require leases 
to include payment schedules with payments that fluctuate depending on 
the lessee’s level of risk.  Such complex calculations would require lessors 
to hire insurance experts.  The lessor would also have to determine risk by 
monitoring the lessee’s accident rate.  Such functions would duplicate a 
monitoring system that insurance companies already have in place.  
Further, the financing companies would need to hire additional staff to 
complete the requisite paperwork whenever a lessee changed risk pools.  It 
seems likely that it would be cheaper for the lessor to charge all lessees the 
same rate without trying to incorporate a lessee’s changing risk or adverse 
selection into the leasing agreement.  A separate insurance policy 
specifically focusing on risk is a better option. 
Third, unlike the lessor, the insurance company might have knowledge 
of changes in a lessee’s propensity for risk because the lessee must notify 
the insurer if he wants to make a claim against his insurance policy, for 
example, if he is involved in an accident.  The insurer will learn the facts of 
the accident and how much it cost, and may then compile a record of the 
lessee’s driving history to determine whether the lessee has become more 
risky.  Under section 388, however, a lessor would only learn of an 
accident if the lessor was sued.because the lessee will not report an 
accident or other parts of his driving record just to alert the lessor that he 
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should be charged a higher premium.125
Lastly, insurance companies are in a better position to insure because 
they can better narrow insurance risk pools.
  Even if the lessor required the 
lessee to report such information, if the insurer is already compiling it, it 
would be inefficient for the lessor to do so as well. 
126  As stated, insurance cannot 
be efficient unless the insured are segregated into pools based on the risk 
they pose.127  Insurers are able to do this for drivers based in part on the 
insured’s driving record.  Because the insurer has better access to this 
record than a lessor, the insurer will be in a better position to place the 
lessee in the appropriate risk pool.  If a lessor is held vicariously liable, 
however, it will either self-insure or obtain liability insurance for a lessee’s 
torts.  The lessor’s policy will have to cover all of the lessor’s lessees, and 
because the lessor will be unable to distinguish between high-risk and low-
risk lessees after the lease has commenced, it will result in an adverse 
selection problem.128  Thus, the lessor’s policy will charge the lessor a 
premium based on the average risk of its lessees.  This cost will be passed 
onto lessees when they lease their vehicles, thus causing low-risk lessees to 
pay a higher premium than they would if they bought their own insurance, 
and high-risk lessees to pay a lower premium.129  This is an inefficient 
result because some low-risk potential lessees will decide that this added 
expense is too high and they will not lease.130  When several low-risk 
consumers choose not to lease, the proportion of high-risk consumers in the 
pool increases, as does the cost of the lessor’s premium per lessee.131  
Leasing thus becomes more expensive and increasingly unattractive to low-
risk drivers.132  By making leasing—which low-risk drivers might prefer 
absent adverse selection—economically unattractive, section 388133
 
 125. A lessor could also learn of an accident at the end of the lease term if the car itself is 
damaged.  At this stage, however, the lease term has expired and the lessor’s propensity for 
risk is irrelevant. 
 is most 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 92 and 94. 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 128. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.  The lessor may be able to distinguish 
between high-risk and low-risk lessees at the beginning of the lease based on objective 
features of the lessee, such as age or gender, but will be unable to do so for subjective 
details without demanding a driving record.  After the lease commences, the lessor has no 
way of learning subjective details of the lessee’s risk without heavy transaction costs, such 
as demanding periodic driving records or monitoring the lessee.  Once again, insurance 
companies already collect this information so if the lessors did so as well it would be 
inefficiently duplicative. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
 133. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2004). 
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unfair to good drivers.  Furthermore, it under-deters high-risk drivers 
because they will be paying lower prices than their risk level dictates.  This 
problem would not occur if the lessor did not have to insure himself for 
vicarious liability under section 388. 
Section 388 forces financing companies to assume the role of an 
insurance company.  But, as shown, insurance companies are clearly better 
than financing companies at assessing risk and varying their rates 
according to risk.  Furthermore, since insurance companies already provide 
similar services, if financing companies provide them too, their services 
would be duplicative.  Making financing companies provide insurance is 
inefficient when there is a partyin this case an insurance company—
better suited to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Holding lessors vicariously liable under section 388 is unjustified and 
inefficient.  Section 388 provides compensation for victims who may 
otherwise go uncompensated, but that objective alone is not sufficient to 
warrant holding a defendant liable.  Vicarious liability in leasing is 
unjustifiable:  Lessors do not profit from lessees’ actions and do not control 
lessees, nor does holding lessors liable internalize the harm the lessee 
causes.  Furthermore, section 388 forces lessors to inefficiently act as 
insurers of their lessees when actual insurance companies would be better, 
cheaper alternatives.  Section 388 results in higher costs to lessors, leading 
to higher costs for consumers and fewer buying options.  Section 388 
should be amended so that automobile lessors are exempt from vicarious 
liability. 
 
